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This paper falls into three parts. The first two deal 
respectively with quantification and the axioms of choice in 
real-variable mathematical analysis, while the third discus- 
ses historical significance in general. This leaves me to 
explain the words “preliminary notes” of my title. They indi- 
cate that each part is intended only to call attention to 
certain aspects of its subject matter which have not been 
studied to the extent that they deserve. Many details are 
omitted, and some over-simplification inevitably results. How- 
ever, it is hoped that the points made will provide sufficient 
compensation. 
PART 1: ON THE EMERGENCE OF QUANTIFICATION, 
AS EXEMPLIFIED IN MODES OF CONVERGENCE. 
I use the term “quantification” in mathematical analysis 
to refer to the techniques of multiple limits, where incre- 
ments are taken on variables denoting real numbers and values 
chosen for suffix variables from their ranges (usually the 
integers), and the functional relationships between these 
variables are represented by an explicit statement of quanti- 
fier order. The language used is at least partly symbolic, 
though not necessarily the full apparatus of the predicate 
calculus. A typical symbolic expression in such analysis 
might begin, say, with 
I shall exemplify the emergence of quantification by de- 
scribing the history of the correction of a well-known false 
theorem. It comes from Cauchy’s Cours d’analyse of 1821 [a,1201 
and reads as follows: “When the different terms of the series 
[CUE] are functions of the same variable x, continuous with 
respect to that variable in the vicinity of a particular value 
for which the series is convergent, the sum s of the series is 
also a continuous function of x in the vicinity of that par- 
ticular value.” 
Abel seems to have been the first to raise public objection 
to this theorem, when he pointed out in 1826 that the Fourier 
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sine series for x/2 over [O,Z], with its discontinuity at x= 
(2m + 1)~ for all integers m, was a counter-example [b, thm.V.1. 
In terms of multiple limits, he was surely thinking of the be- 
haviour of the iterated limited of the n-th partial sum of the 
series as x + a and then n + 00. But multiple limits were not 
handled then with the precision to which we are now accustomed, 
nor were the underlying issues understood. For example, no- 
body at the time seems to have suggested a possible reconcilia- 
tion between Cauchy’s theorem and the counter example by inter- 
preting both as concerned with the double limit of the partial 
sum as n -+ w and x + a. Yet this in effect is how Fourier him- 
self conceived his series (though to the modern view his treat- 
ment was unrigorous); for in both his diagrams and his verbal 
descriptions of his series he included vertical lines across 
the discontinuities (See my and Ravetz’s Fourier [B13], pp. 158- 
170; 192-193; 220-227). He seems to have conceived a series as 
the geometrically connected--and thus continuous--limiting curve 
of its continuous partial sum curves; and if Cauchy’s theorem 
could be applied to such limiting curves, then a reconciliation 
might be effected. But this development does not seem to have 
been tried, though a first step may be seen in Dirksen in his 
1829 review [c] of Cauchyls Cours (See my [Bl3], p. 116). 
However, there was a tendency in the 1820s (not to say la- 
ter) to think of continuous functions as “safe” and so to con- 
fine analysis to them. Cauchy’s theorem exemplifies the tendency 
in asserting the continuity of the sum-function. So does Abel’s 
work, for although he pointed out the (apparent) counter exam- 
ple, he contributed to “safe” theory by proving his famous 
limit theorems. Indeed, he mentioned the counter example in a 
footnote to a theorem which relates to Cauchy’s: if u,(x) is 
continuous over an interval in x and Cui (x)6’ converges, then 
when (O<)a<6, Cui(x)ol is convergent, and Continuous in 0: up 
to R [b, thm.V.1. 
The unreserved acceptance of discontinuous functions into 
analysis was first shown in 1829 [B9] by Dirichlet with his 
sufficient conditions for the convergence of Fourier series, 
where a finite number of finite discontinuities were admitted. 
In terms of multiple limits, he started with the iterated limit 
where x + a and then n -+ m and preserved it throughout his 
proof (See my 1970 The Development of the Foundations of Math- 
ematical Analysis, pp, 97-104). Perhaps significantly, it was 
his student Seidel who was to make the first significant modi- 
fication to Cauchy’s theorem. But before we study his work, let 
us look at Cauchy’s own proof to see how it fails. 
Cauchy’s proof hinges on the equation 
(1-l s (~+a) -s (xl = (sn Ix+4 -sn (xl I+ (rn (~+a) -r, (x) I , 
where sn(x) is continuous, and r,(x) is small. But Cauchy 
went further to assert that (r,(x+a) -m(x)) “becomes insensible 
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at the same time” as rn (x) , 
1201. 
thus proving the theorem [a, p. 
Now to the modern view it is obvious that uniform con- 
vergence is tacitly assumed here. But historically it is not 
easy to say how it is being assumed, or which mode is being 
invoked. We need to examine his phrase “in the vicinity” 
from his statement of the theorem, referring to the neighbour- 
hood of the value of x at which convergence takes place, together 
with his expression “becomes insensible at the same time” in 
his proof, describing the mutual smallness of rn(x+a)-r,(x) 
and r*(x). Is the magnitude of the vicinity dependent on that 
of the insensibility (when we have something like uniform con- 
vergence at a point), or is it independent (which results in 
a version of uniform convergence in the neighbourhood of the 
point) ? Or was Cauchy perhaps thinking of uniform convergence 
over an interval, in line with his definition of the continuity 
of a function which, though formulated in terms of local be- 
haviour , defines the property at all points of an interval [a, 
pp. 34-35]? Surely the answer to these questions is that Cauchy 
had none of these modes of uniform convergence consciously in 
mind, and that his proof is intrinsically vague with respect 
to them. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that, 
although his proof hinged on (1), he did not write it down; in 
fact, he wrote only “un”, “sn”, and “rn”, with “x” omitted, for 
the various parts of the series. In other words, his symbolic 
language was inadequate in a crucial respect. 
Now let us consider Seidel’s modification, made in a paper 
[B37] of 1848. He began by remarking on the contradiction be- 
tween Cauchy’s theorem and Dirichlet’s conditions, and pro- 
posed the following definition: the series cur(x) (and Seidel 
did include the argument variable in his symbolism, actually 
writing "F(x,n)") converged “not arbitrarily slowly” if V, the 
value of n for which Irn(x+E) 1 < p for all n > v, tends to 
infinity as E tends to zero, By laborious means (described 
in [B13, pp. 112-114]), he vindicated Cauchy’s theorem for 
not arbitrarily slow convergence. But it would be historical- 
ly naive to identify Seidel’s definition with uniform conver- 
gence, for the formulation is again not in that style, although 
it differs also from Cauchy’s phraseology in the Cours. Al- 
though v depends on E, their relationship to P is not clear. 
More importantly, in requiring E tn achieve its limiting value 
zero, Seidel spoiled the limit-avoiding style of mathematical 
analysis that he was trying to enrich. Similar comments can be 
made about a definition of “not infinitely slow” convergence 
which Stokes introduced independently around the same time 
[~381. In that case, quasi-uniform convergence in the nei h- 
bourhood of a point seems to be the closest approximation 
pp. 113-1171. 
f B13, 
It is interesting to note that at exactly the 
time that Seidel and Stokes were refining Cauchy’s theorem, 
Wilbraham was modifying Fourier’s geometrical representation 
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of Fourier series and introducing, in his 1848 paper [d], the 
mis-named "Gibbs phenomenon.11 
The modification of Cauchy's theorem to include uniform 
convergence as we understand it was made by Cauchy himself in 
a paper [B7] of 1853. He expressed uniformity by suitably modi- 
fying his necessary and sufficient condition for convergence: 
1 s, ' (xl -s, (xl 1 "becomes always infinitely small for infinitely 
large values of the numbers n and n’>n.” The context made 
clear that "always" referred to all values of x over the inter- 
val in question, so that uniform convergence over that interval 
was now embodied in the conditions of the theorem. NOW the 
functional relationship between the increments could be clearly 
understood, and the exegesis of multiple-limit analysis carried 
out properly. 
However, I do not wish to imply that it is to Cauchy that 
we owe the development of modes of convergence. His paper, a 
rather hastily written piece, has little in it for real-variable 
analysis beyond the modified theorem and necessary and suffi- 
cient condition. The new leader was Weierstrass, who used the 
term "uniform convergence" in a manuscript of 1841 [B39, vol. 1, 
pp. 68-69]--that is, before Seidel and Stokes. He may have taken 
the idea (though not the terminology) from his teacher Gudermann 
[BlO, p. 471. 
The history of the development of Weierstrassian multiple- 
limit analysis is difficult to describe, for much of the ins- 
piration came from Weierstrass's unpublished lectures at 
Berlin. The first published manifestation of the new ideas 
came from others. For example, in 1870, Heine remarked that 
Weierstrass had noticed the assumption of uniform convergence 
over an interval in the proof that a series of functions can be 
integrated term-by-term, and he himself introduced uniform con- 
tinuity [B20]. 
Over the rest of the century and beyond other modes of uni- 
form, quasi-uniform and non-(quasi-) uniform convergence were 
gradually introduced and the relationships between them ex- 
plored [B19]. An important example is Weierstrass's proof in 
1880 [x, art. l= B39, vol. 2, pp. 201-2331 that if a series is 
uniformly convergent in the neighbourhood of a point then it is 
uniformly convergent over an interval. He took a particular 
value a of x and assumed a quantity o for which Cf,,(x) was 
uniformly convergent for all x satisfying Ix-a/L P: 
"I will say that the series converges uniformly 
in the neighbourhood of the point a. The quantity p 
then has an upper limit; let this be R, so the c01- 
lection of values of x for which Ix-al < R may be 
called--in relation to the considered series--the vicinity 
of x, and R its half-measure. One assumes any point one 
likes in this vicinity, so it is clear that the series 
also converges uniformly in the neighbourhood of the 
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latter [point]. It follows from this, that the col- 
lection of points in whose neighbourhood the series 
conver es uniformly is represented in the plane 
[Ebene! of h t e variable x by a simple surface [FlXche], 
but which can exist as several pieces separated from 
each other .” 
This last sentence shows that Weierstrass even had uniform con- 
vergence by intervals in mind. In footnotes he explained that 
a simple surface is one “which goes through no point more than 
once” and that uniform convergence was defined for all points 
of a part (or sub-region) of the “region of convergence” of 
Cfv (x). To this latter remark he nonchalantly added a test for 
uniform convergence known today as “Weierstrassls M-test”! 
The mixture here of symbolism and quantificationally clear 
natural language is typical of the period, and is significant 
from the points of view now under discussion. So also is 
Weierstrass’s assumption of what we now recognise as the 
“Heine-Bore1 theorem” (whose history is briefly described in 
the third part of this paper), for it exemplifies other devel- 
opments of the period becoming involved in the study of modes 
of convergence and the emergence of quantification: definitions 
of irrationals, conscious distinctions between upper/lower 
limits and least upper/greatest lower bounds, existence theorems 
for limits, and so on [e], [f], [w]. There was also considerable 
attention given to the foundations of the calculus, a branch 
of analysis of comparable importance to modes of convergence 
for the genesis of quantification: the (ever-changing) relation- 
ship between continuity and differentiability, the fundamental 
and mean-value theorems, differentials, and the whole range of 
multi-variate analysis [g]. And along with all these develop- 
ments came an increasing use of symbolic language, for the 
distinctions now being operated were too delicate to be mani- 
pulated easily by means of natural language. It was the 
language of quantification, in the sense which I defined at 
the beginning of this part. 
The passage to a fully symbolic expression of multiple 
limit analysis was a complex process in which all branches of 
the subject seem to have played a role. Examination of some 
principal text-books and papers suggests that symbolism became 
steadily more prominent and that care in explicitly using the 
positive values of quantities and in handling the arithmetic 
of inequalities correspondingly improved in standard. It would 
not be possible even to sketch out here these developments; 
indeed, such an enterprise is one of those to which these 
preliminary notes are intended to call attention. However, 
mention must be made of Peano, who worked equally in Weierstras- 
sian analysis and in the mathematical logic of quantification 
and exerted by far the greatest single influence in the symboli- 
sation of analysis. The Formulario mathematico which he edited 
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in various editions (and under various titles) from 1894 to 
1908 was a most important exposition of such techniques, and 
the journal Revue des math6matiques contained many research 
articles in these fields. 
PART 2: ON THE AXIOMS 
OF CHOICE AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS 
I trust that the discussion above shows, albeit briefly 
and through exemplification, that during the Weierstrassian 
period a critical re-examination of the early 19th century 
analysis was carried out, refining its basically single- 
limit style into a form able to handle multiple-limit tech- 
niques with proper attention to quantification and the relation- 
ship between increments. Weierstrassian analysis received a 
critical re-examination of its own, and in this part I want to 
outline a prominent part of that revision: the axioms of choice 
and their ramifications. 
Today we usually speak of “the axiom of choice,” but one of 
the most interesting features of the history is that there never 
was only one such axiom. For during the decade following 
Zermelo’s postulation of a selection function in 1904 [h], 
which crystallised into an explicit axiom of choice the occa- 
sional previous awareness of assumptions concerning infinite 
selections, various different axioms were suggested [i]. Of 
particular importance was the 
by Russell in 1905 [j], 
“multiplicative axiom” published 
whose need he seems to have realised 
independently of Zermelo (see [BlS, sect. 141). 
Both axioms had arisen in connection with Cantor’s 
Mengenlehre: Zermelo’s in proving the well-ordering principle, 
and Russell’s in defining the product of an infinity of car- 
dinals. But we can associate them with the re-examination of 
Weierstrassian analysis, for Cantor developed his Mengenlehre 
as a consequence of his study of trigonometric series [~8] and 
he regarded his new theory as an extension of mathematical 
analysis. The axioms of choice turned out to be necessary for 
several parts of the Mengenlehre ([k, arts. l-41; [Bl8, passim]) 
the equivalence of the non-inductive and reflexive definitions 
of infinity; various theorems relating cardinal addition, 
multiplication and exponentiation; all sorts of theorems about 
the cardinalities of non-denumerable sets; many properties of 
the series of transfinite ordinals; the proof that a limit- 
point of a set is an accumulation point, and thus a variety of 
results involving closed sets, including the Bolzano-Weierstrass 
theorem (and hence the Heine-Bore1 theorem); and several decom- 
position theorems for the line and plane. 
The axioms also arose in 
t-k, arts. S-91. 
“orthodox” Weierstrassian analysis 
The transposition of universal and existen- 
tial quantifiers could require an axiom if their ranges were 
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infinite. Measure theory, in itself a major advance of that 
time over the treatment of integration in the Weierstrassian 
period [l], used such axioms for theorems on infinite additi- 
vity, the construction of non-measurable sets, and elsewhere. 
In the theory of functions, these axioms were necessary for such 
a basic result as the equivalence of the Cauchy definition of 
continuity of a function ((f (x%)-f (xl) is small with a; [a, 
pp.34-351) with the Cantor-Heine definition (if x, -f x as n + m, 
then f  (x,) -+ f  (xl ; [m, p. 1821)) never mind such sophisticated 
studies as analytically representable functions and Baire’s 
classification [n]. 
However, the acceptance of these axioms was not unquestioned. 
Several theorems which used an axiom were re-proved without it, 
while there was controversy over whether some other theorems 
needed an axiom of choice. For example, only gradually did it 
become clear that the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem would need such 
an axiom if “infinite” was defined non-inductively (as opposed 
to reflexively) and if the existence of a limit-point (as op- 
posed to an accumulation point) was asserted, but would not need 
an axiom otherwise [k, art. 41. 
A further point of controversy was whether or not the new 
axioms were logically equivalent to each other. For example, 
Russell took a few years to see that his multiplicative axiom 
could be cast in a form equivalent to Zermelo’s axiom [B18, sect. 
171. The question was of philosophical as well as mathematical 
interest. All these axioms postulated the existence of a func- 
tion (such as Zermelo’s selection function) or a class (for ex- 
ample, Russell’s multiplicative class), or the validity of a 
process (such as the construction of a maximal class) or a pro- 
perty (for example, the trichotomy law for cardinals); but the 
degrees of non-constructivity--and thus acceptability--of these 
axioms seemed to some mathematicians to be different [o]. For 
example, the French school discussed at some length (beginning 
in [p]) simultaneous as opposed to successive selections, and 
denumerable vis-8-vis non-denumerable choice, and the related 
questions of mathematical definition and existence. Perhaps the 
most substantial criticism of non-constructivity and exis- 
tence at that time was Brouwer’s development of intuition- 
istic set theory, which not only rejected axioms of choice but 
also the traditional use of the law of excluded middle. His 
papers of the early 1910s on the Cantor-Bendixsonandrelated 
theorems [q] exemplify well the extent to which he broadened 
the issue of constructive versus non-constructive processes 
in set theory and analysis. Indeed, his work on set theory 
seems to contain valuable clues for the understanding of his 
intuitionistic logic. 
Mention of logic brings me back again to quantification, 
for the word is most closely associated in the sense used in 
this paper with logic and was so introduced by Peirce in the 
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1880s [r]. Hence it would be appropriate to close this part 
with an example of an axiom of choice, quantification and the 
continuity of functions all at work together. Whitehead and 
Russell’s Principia mathematics of 1910-13 contains a discussion 
of both the Cauchy and the Cantor-Heine definitions of the con- 
tinuity of a function, both expressed in their sophisticated 
symbolic language [s, * 2341. Quantifiers.are prominent (though 
not for the purpose of expressing uniformity, since mathematical 
analysis was not developed that far in their work). The multi- 
plicative axiom was already embodied in various previous defini- 
tions and results. Sequences of integers and of real numbers 
were now fields of Fregean ancestral relations, with the con- 
tinuous function serving as a mapping between them. Thus 
Whitehead and Russell could announce that “It will be observed 
that practically nothing in the theory of continuous functions 
requires the use of numbers.” [s, vol. 2, p. 7251. As mathe- 
matical style, this was a long way from Cauchy! 
PART 3: ON THE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
How very “interesting” these historical accounts may be, 
but do they matter? I often find that mathematicians see the 
history of their subject only as a reservoir of factual informa, 
tion or as a source of anecdote or biography. I shall argue 
in this part that a greater significance than this can be 
attached to historical work, greater not only for the sake of 
the historical record but especially for the understanding and 
pursuance of mathematics at all levels, including teaching 
and research. I shall also try to point out some of the ways 
in which mathematicians and historians differ in their approaches 
to the history of mathematics. 
Let me take first the introduction of new distinctions. 
They are an important source of advance in mathematical know- 
ledge, and have been well exemplified above: distinctions be- 
tween modes of uniform and non-uniform convergence, between the 
two definitions of infinity, between forms of the axioms of 
choice, and so on. The pre-history of a new distinction is not 
easy to interpret historically. Suppose that since a certain 
time we have distinguished between A and B. How should we 
read the earlier literature? We may find A and no B; or B and 
no A; or both A and B but no explicit recognition of their 
relationship; or very often a C or two which are neither A nor 
B but something else which could be interpreted as either by 
means which the theory containing C cannot express. 
From the point of view of mathematics, the new distinctions 
are a source of further work, including the reworking and re- 
reading of previous results. But from the point of view of his- 
tory, they are very likely to be a source of post-hoccery, of 
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historical verification of old work in terms of some fashion- 
able current view which in fact at that time was scarcely known, 
of the “correction” of earlier literature to a currently ac- 
cepted form. In history we need to construct ignorance situa- 
tions for our historical figures, that is, branches of relevant 
knowledge constructed between their period and ours of which 
they were essentially ignorant. 
It is not easy to construct an ignorance situation for an 
historical figure, since normally he will not have said much 
about the problems which he could not solve and of which he 
might not have been aware. A recommended approach is to read 
later text-books, but in my opinion this method is limited in 
use by the degree to which the text-book writer understood the 
development of the mathematics which he was presenting. A 
much better method is to examine later research work, with 
especial reference to the claimed novelties of each stage of 
later progress. Even this approach is not infallible, for ideas 
and techniques were often rediscovered; but it should yield a 
serviceable approximation to the ignorance situation sought. 
The emergence of new distinctions exemplifies the problem 
of the use in historical work of later ideas of any kind. The 
belief that the historian can think himself back fully into 
the conceptions of the period under study is illusory; even if 
achieved, it cannot be proven to have been achieved. Much more 
likely is that remnants at least of the work of the intermediate 
periods will remain, which makes it all the more essential for 
them to be recognised as later work. Sometimes these later 
ideas can be put to the good purpose of inspiring questions to 
be asked of the period which they succeeded, but they cannot 
be transplanted uncritically back onto the period itself. For 
the assumption of a later idea in an historical interpretation 
necessarily prevents the historical account of its own emer- 
gence; the pertinent historical questions cannot even be asked, 
never mind answered. For example, the emergence of quantifica- 
tion exemplifies the general problem of the comparative roles 
of symbolic and natural languages in the development of mathe- 
matical analysis, but it would be historically disastrous to 
insert quantifier language into any previous mathematics 
which could be construed as involving its use. For then it 
would be being taken for granted, as it were, and questions 
about its emergence could not be posed. 
Another feature of the history of mathematics which has 
been exemplified above is the way in which a branch of mathe- 
matics may develop in phases, each one with its own problems 
and techniques which become important for a time before re- 
ducing to insignificant details or making way for fresh approa- 
ches. We saw the early stages of mathematical analysis in 
Cauchy’s tours d'analyse, which supplanted the algebraic, oper- 
ator-oriented, conceptions of the calculus and of summability 
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(not described above) dominant in the late 18th century. Then the 
Weierstrassian period took over for the last third of the 19th 
century, enriching the previous phase with multiple-limit tech- 
niques and explicit attention to quantification. Finally we saw 
Weierstrassian analysis itself (including Cantorian Mengenlehre) 
appraised for its unintended assumptions of axioms of choice. 
One aspect of progress by phases is the change in priority 
(using the word in the sense of “importance”) which theories ex- 
perience, quite possibly independently of any marked change in 
their content. The historian must try to reconstruct the prior- 
ity structure for the particular developments which he is study- 
ing. In particular, he must bear in mind that possibly it will 
be very different from the structure prevalent today. Mathema- 
ticians of long ago may well have studied intensively certain 
aspects of their work which now appear of little significance. 
Butifthey found these aspects important, then their historians 
must treat them as important also, and try to discover the 
sources of the importance then held. 
By contrast and with perfect legitimacy, the mathematician 
will transplant his own priority structure onto any earlier 
work on which he is drawing, in order to enlighten his own 
situation as much as possible. Indeed, his interests will de- 
termine the choice of earlier work, for naturally he will dis- 
card material which today is of low priority. A danger arises, 
however, for priority means relevance, relevance means inter- 
connections, and sometimes these are not of the obvious kind. 
The last historical feature which I wish to emphasise is 
the use to which the history of mathematics may be put in 
mathematical education. It seems to me not only “interesting” 
but most valuable for students (who are not usually training to 
become professional mathematicians, after all) to see mathematics 
evolving as some sort of historical process. Then they can re- 
live earlier work and create for themselves the discoveries of 
the past. Obviously it is not possible or desirable for detailed 
historical work to be done. But it should be feasible to 
present the major stages and crucial results in imitation of 
the historical record, with the actual historical details light- 
ly handled. This is a process of learning which elsewhere I have 
called “history-satire” [t, pp. 445-4501. 
Consider, for example, Cauchy’s false theorem, and its pro- 
gress from Cauchy’s proof through Abel’s counter-example, 
Dirichlet’s conditions for Fourier series, and Seidel’s modifi- 
cation, to the introduction of modes of convergence. Learning 
analysis through a sequence of events like that would be much 
more exciting for the great majority of students than ploughing 
through the modern text-books on the subject, with their rigor- 
ous Chapters One and the inevitable progression of impeccable 
definitions and theorems thereafter. In fact, closer examina- 
tion of these books often reveals less clarity of presentation 
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than might be expected. The levels of rigour associated with 
each phase are often merged together. Thus, for example, the 
theory of limits and continuity of functions may be dressed 
up in topological clothing which is mostly ignored later. 
Again, enough set topology is provided to serve as a basis for 
measure theory, but the Cauchy-Riemann integral is usually 
developed instead. Multiple-limit analysis, whose import- 
ance Weierstrass himself emphasised in his lectures [u, p. 2561, 
is not normally accorded such prominence nowadays; quantifier 
order will be emphasised in some definitions and proofs, and 
uniformity or non-uniformity introduced into various theorems, 
but the underlying connections and common significance are not 
stressed. Axioms of choice are either passed over in silence or 
introduced without indication of their importance beyond the 
printing of an asterisk against the titles of theorems in which 
they are used--a hangover from the days of the controversy. 
A good example of the merging of phases is the name 
"Heine-Bore1 theorem " introduced by Sch6nflies in 1900 [B36, 
p. 1191. The theore; itself was proved by Bore1 in 1895 [v, 
p. 513 and was a significant result for the analysis in which 
the axioms of choice played a role. Heine's name was attached 
to it for the superficial reason that in proving in 1872 that 
a finite-valued continuous function is uniformly continuous 
over a finite interval, he partitioned the interval into a 
finite number of sub-intervals [m, p. 1881. This theorem is 
typical of the Weierstrassian period in being concerned with 
uniformity. 
I have laid emphasis on the distinction between the attitudes 
of mathematicians and historians to the history of mathematics. 
In general, mathematicians make use of earlier mathematics 
primarily as an aid to the elucidation of old and new mathema- 
tical problems which they are trying to solve. They tend to 
conserve this attitude even when taking an explicitly historical 
interest in their subject. Thus they will interpret any given 
piece of earlier mathematics in terms of a current or a later 
version, and then evaluate it in that context. I do not say that 
this is "wrong"; from the standpoint of their objectives, it is 
probably the "right" thing to do. But they are wrong, I feel, 
to think that the later version clarifies the earlier one. It 
may clarify the earlier mathematics as mathematics, and it should 
clarify the later version itself; but in all likelihood it will 
blur the earlier mathematics as history, as a progress of events 
long ago. The mathematicians' interest in an historical period 
is oriented towards its post-history, whereas the historians em- 
phasise its pre-history. 
These differences of attitude reveal a paradox: that there 
is both interaction and autonomy in the relationship between 
history and mathematics. The resolution of this paradox lies 
at the heart of the history of mathematics. If this conference 
486 I. Grattan-Guinness HM2 
can provide some clues towards such a resolution, then it 
will be an important event. 
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DISCUSSION 
Dou opened the discussion by suggesting that it might be 
better to try to distinguish the concerns of the historian from 
those of the mathematician in terms of the tools available 
to the two disciplines. For example, when comparing the lan- 
guage used, a mathematician can use well-defined standard 
symbols. This provides a language which historians and philos- 
ophers cannot use and, according to DOU, the resulting discourse 
has a different level of precision. 
Kahane then suggested that mathematicians think on two 
levels all the time, namely, foundations and problems, so that 
the distinction between the two is not sharp. Thus measure 
theory is a part of foundations today, but in the early 1900s 
it was concerned with specific problems. Birkhoff supported 
Kahane’s distinction, asserting that problems deal with ques- 
tions whose answers are unknown, whereas foundations have to do 
with the assumptions which must be made in order to deduce an 
agreed-upon conclusion. May suggested that problems can be 
likened to legal questions, while foundational issues are anal- 
ogous to legal precedents. 
Browder felt that one should take into account questions of 
priorities. These may be difficult to discern, but they can 
play a key role in the selection and status of problems. Thus 
the same question can be logically foundational, yet at an earli- 
er time have the status of a problem whose answer people were 
really concerned about. 
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Grattan-Guinness, however, denied the importance of the dis- 
tinction between problems and foundations. Instead, he proposed 
a third category: the mathematics of textbooks. He claimed 
that such mathematics is also meta-mathematics, a realm in which 
the mathematician is talking about mathematics as well as doing 
it. 
